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 The impact of corporate social responsibility initiatives on shareholder value is uncertain.  
Research points to both positive and negative market reaction to the announcement of a firm 
either being recognized for its social responsibility or voluntarily engaging in an activity that 
would presumably be perceived as such.  In this study, I examine market reaction to a firm’s 
decision to make a voluntary, yet legally binding and potentially costly commitment to reduce 
green house gas emissions by joining the now-defunct Chicago Climate Exchange.  The Chicago 
Climate Exchange, as a field experiment, provides a unique opportunity to study the connection 
between corporate social responsibility and market valuation because the expected and actual 
costs of non-compliance are more observable, when compared against non legally binding 
initiatives.  I find that the market reacts negatively to a firm’s decision to join as evidenced by 
negative, although insignificant, cumulative abnormal returns and significant declines in trading 
volumes around the announcement date.  Price reaction is negatively associated with a firm’s 
price-to-book ratio in the year prior to joining the exchange and positively associated with the 
Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini Research & Analytics (KLD) rating of a firm’s environmental 
strengths.  Trading volume is positively associated with firm size, measured with market 
capitalization in the year prior to the announcement. Larger firms were less likely to make the 
commitment, whereas, firms in more highly concentrated industries and those with higher KLD 
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In the face of environmental concerns, there is mounting pressure for firms to adopt more 
environmentally friendly business practices. Such practices comprise one aspect of corporate 
social responsibility (CSR). Of debate is whether CSR is in the best interests of shareholders. 
One side of the argument is that a conflict between management and shareholders arises due to 
management allocating resources towards improving the firm’s social responsibility when these 
resources could be put towards projects with greater expectations of financial returns, and in 
doing so they are decreasing the value to the shareholders (Hillman & Keim, 2001; Thornburn & 
Vanden, 2008). The other side is that CSR can increase value to shareholders by improving 
public relations, demonstrating an ability to keep up with technological advancements or 
demonstrating a greater knowledge of the possible future government regulations (Kempf & 
Osthoff, 2007; Klassen & McLaughlin, 1996; Konar, 2001; Orlitzky, 2003).  
Increasing concern over green house gas (GHG) emission, more specifically the problem 
of global warming, have appeared in the media, politics and in academia. Although debate 
continues over the existence of global warming, the magnitude of the problem and the impact 
that humans can have on it, the majority of academic studies find that GHG emissions and global 
warming are in fact very real problems that we are face (IPCC
1
,: Schneider, 1989; Young, 1992). 
Governments and organizations are turning to regulation as a means to control the problem, the 
most notable being the introduction of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997. Under the Kyoto Protocol, 





industrialized countries are required to reduce their aggregate GHG emissions 5.2% below their 
1990 emissions levels before the protocol expires in 2012.  However, not all industrialized 
countries are in agreement with the Kyoto Protocol objectives. The United States, which happens 
to be one of the largest emitters of GHGs (Matthews et al. 2007), failed to come to an agreement 
on an emissions reduction schedule and refused to sign the protocol, arguing that the opportunity 
costs of regulating GHG emissions to the U.S. economy are too high when weighed against the 
improvements to social welfare (Barker & Ekins, 2004). In response to the lack of regulation in 
the U.S. and the recognition of the severity of the problems related to GHG emissions, some 
firms and organizations have voluntarily begun reducing their emissions.  
 Politics looms large in the issues surrounding corporate social responsibility. It has been 
argued that the demise of the Chicago Climate Exchange in 2010 was the result of waning 
government endorsement and an unwillingness of the U.S. government to table legislation 
requiring a reduction of greenhouse gas emissions.  This, in turn, implies that interest in the 
market, and more importantly, the value of corporate social responsibility itself, as it applies to 
pollution reduction, is driven by the threat of potentially costly political action.  Investors do not 
value corporate social responsibility if it does not hurt to ignore it; they are not interested in 
placing bets on firms committing to good corporate social responsibility if threats are not 
imminent—Don’t bother unless you have to.  But despite its collapse, the Chicago Climate 
Exchange is a valuable field experiment from which we can explore the market’s reaction to the 
firms that joined and committed to reducing emissions, and ask how these firms differ from those 
that did not join.  The challenge is in operationalizing public and private political threats.  The 
most direct measure I use in this study, although very noisy, is Sierra Club membership in the 
state in which each firm is headquartered.  Others, such as ratings of environmental strengths and 
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concerns as published by Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini Research & Analytics (KLD), are less 
direct, or even ambiguous, because these could measure firm attributes that are valued (or not) 
by consumers or employees as much as they can be signals that will attract unwanted political 
attention.  Even less direct perhaps is firm size or industry concentration, normally thought of as 
purely “financial” variables but equally “political” in the sense that the big ones tend to attract 
more (unwanted) attention and therefore be more motivated to act in, what are perceived to be, 
socially acceptable ways. 
 With this caveat, I find that the market reacts negatively to a firm’s decision to join the 
CCX as evidenced by negative, although insignificant, cumulative abnormal returns and 
significant declines in trading volumes around the announcement date.  Price reaction is 
negatively associated with a firm’s price-to-book ratio in the year prior to joining the exchange 
and positively associated with the KLD rating of a firm’s environmental strengths.  Trading 
volume is positively associated with firm size.  Firms in more highly concentrated industries 
were more likely to have joined the exchange, as were those with higher KLD rankings for 
community strengths. Firm size is negatively associated with a firm’s decision to join, that is, 
larger firms are less likely to join.  
 The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews literature on CSR, influencing factors 
and market reaction. Section 3 discusses the issue of global warming and possible solutions. 
Section 4 reviews previous markets for emissions reduction. Section 5 outlines the Chicago 
Climate Exchange. Section 6 explores factors which might motivate a firm to become involved 
with CSR. Section 7 summarizes financial, industry and environmental statistics. Section 8 and 9 
reports and interprets results. Section 10 summarizes and concludes the thesis, providing a 
discussion of possible future work. 
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2.  Background 
There has been debate over the impact that corporate socially responsibility (CSR) has on 
financial performance, with some studies finding that CSR leads to improvement in performance 
and others finding a negative impact. Renneboog et al. (2008) and Beurden et al. (2008) provide 
an extensive review of studies on CSR and their relation to firm performance; the main findings 
of their paper indicate that past work suggests reaction to CSRs are dependent on a variety of 
internal and external factors, with firm size, industry and R&D being the most reoccurring 
significant variables. Overall studies find a positive relationship between shareholder value and 
CSR investments. Using KLD data as a measure for CSR performance, Galema et al. (2008) find 
that on average firms with higher CSR ratings tend to outperform similar firms with lower CSR 
ratings. In a meta-analysis of 52 studies Orlitzky et al. (2003) find that there is a positive 
correlation between CSR performance and financial performance of the firm. Results also 
indicate that the relationship is bidirectional, meaning that in certain cases higher CSR leads to 
higher financial performance and at other times it is higher financial performance that leads to 
higher CSR.  Kempf et al. (2007) find that using a strategy in which portfolios are built around 
firms that rate high on CSR, an investor can earn annual abnormal returns in the range of 8.7%. 
Although they find a positive relationship between CSR and financial performance they question 
whether the performance might be due to a temporary mispricing in the market and suggest this 
might be an area for future research. Levi and Newton (2011) explore the persistence of the 
increase in returns of firms that are recognized as being socially responsible firms. In their study 
Newsweek’s “Green List” is used to identify firms with positive environmental responsibility 
ratings. They find that, although there is a positive increase in performance around the green 
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listing announcement, the increase in returns appears to be temporary and is eventually 
corrected. 
 In some cases there is a negative relationship between CSR and financial performance. 
Fisher-Vanden and Thorburn (2008) explore market reactions to firms announcing voluntary 
corporate environmental initiatives, using Climate Leaders and Ceres as a measure for these 
initiatives. They find significantly negative abnormal returns for around the announcement date 
of a company taking on either initiative. Overall results indicate a negative correlation between 
these environmental initiatives and financial performance.  
Unlike previous studies, this paper examines the performance and characteristics of firms 
that joined the Chicago Climate exchange, and thereby made a legally binding commitment to 
reduce emissions. Participation in the exchange mimicked the legal obligations that would be in 
place under government regulation and running of such a market. The following section outlines 









3. Global Warming 
Once the problem of global warming is understood, possible solutions to the problem 
based on three forms of government regulation are reviewed. A successful form of government 
regulation for sulphur dioxide emissions in the U.S. is discussed, suggesting that the possibility 
of using a similar method to reduce GHG emissions in the U.S. The section concludes with a 
discussion and outline of a voluntary cap and trade program for GHG emissions in U.S.  
3.1 What is Global Warming? 
  Global warming can be described as an increase in the trend of average global near 
surface air and ocean temperatures. Sceptics argue that current warming trends are a natural 
phenomenon where the temperature of the earth fluctuates, going through periods of heating and 
then cooling. These heating and cooling periods are found to be real, and relate to changes in the 
sun’s cycle. However, the problem in question is not whether the earth goes through natural 
periods of cooling and warming, but whether the current trend of increasing global temperatures 
is a result of changes in the sun’s cycle or anomalies to the natural cycle. A report written by the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2007) finds that there has been an increase 
of 0.74°C in average global temperatures between 1906 and 2005. This heating trend was found 
to be relatively worse in the latter 50 years where the average increase was 0.13°C per decade, 
indicating that the problem is getting persistently worse. A study designed to explain the portion 
of global warming caused by natural solar cycles since 1610 finds that since 1860 only portions 
of the increase in average temperature can be explained by changes in the sun’s cycle. Between 
1610 and 1800, the changes in global temperatures can  be explained by the natural solar cycle; 
however, between 1860 and 1990 the solar cycle can only account for half of the increase in 
9 
 
global temperatures and for only one third of the warming since 1970 (Foukal, 1990). These 
findings suggest that although the earth is undergoing a natural increase in temperature, the 
changes that we have observed in the past 150 years are not fully explained by the natural cycle, 
and that anomalies are becoming more common. The problem that we are now faced with is 
understanding the causes of these temperature anomalies and whether or not they are a result of 
human involvement in the natural environment. Scientists explain the increase in green houses 
gases as being a result of growth in industrial activities since the 18
th
 century (Schneider, 1989). 
The industrial revolution led to an increase in the release of green house gases into the 
atmosphere, continuing at an increasing rate into the 21
st
 century. Green house gases are gases 
that are naturally found in the earth’s atmosphere, which trap solar energy and therefore heat the 
earth. Without the presence of green house gases in the atmosphere the earth’s average 
temperature would be 33°C lower then it is and would not be able to support life (Schneider, 
1989). When an excess amount of green house gases are released into the atmosphere, the natural 
balance of necessary gases is disturbed, leading to the warming.  
3.2 Green House Gases 
As the GHGs absorb infrared radiation, not allowing it to exit the earth’s atmosphere, the 
temperature of the earth is maintained at the level required to sustain life. The main GHGs 
present in the Earth’s atmosphere are water vapour, carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, 
ozone and chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs).  Global industrial activity since the middle of the 
eighteenth century has led to a substantial increase in the amount of GHGs present in the 
atmosphere. Although an excessive amount of any of these GHGs gases can have a harmful 
effect on the environment, it has been the increase in carbon dioxide released since the industrial 
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revolution that has come to the forefront of environmental concern in the past few years. The 
increase comes from the burning of fossil fuels such as coal and oil. Schneider (1989) and  Chen 
et al. (1986) suggested that there is reason for concern over the amount of pollution caused by 
human activity. It is not only the increase of 25% of the amount of CO2 present in the 
atmosphere that is of great concern but also the increasing  exponential trend of the presence 
which  indicates that the problem is worsening.  
As humans require more space for roadways, factories, agricultural land and cities, they 
are required to cut and clear naturally occurring forests; this process is known as deforestation. 
Deforestation further compounds the problems associated with post industrial revolution 
pollution by further disturbing the natural equilibrium of  in the atmosphere. Plants, more 
specifically trees in forests, act as filters for excess  through a process known as 
photosynthesis. As plants grow,  is transformed into carbon (C) in the plant’s tissues and 
oxygen ( ) is released into the atmosphere. As forests are cut down, fewer trees are left 
available for this filtering process and therefore more  is found in the atmosphere.  
3.3 The Need For a Reduction in Emissions 
Since the effects that green house gases have on global warming tend to be lagged it is 
difficult to determine the specific impact that a GHG has on global warming at the time it is 
emitted, therefore making it difficult to determine the reduction required for improvement 
(Nordhaus, 1991). The current opinion is that reducing emissions to the levels in 1990 would 
allow for the curbing of the global warming without having a large impact on economic 
prosperity. The objective of reducing GHG emissions to the 1990 level was adopted by the 
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United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC
2
) and put into effect in the 
framework of the Kyoto Protocol. The Kyoto Protocol was adopted in 1997 and came into effect 
in early 2005. Its main objective was to have all countries cooperate to reduce global GHG 
emissions with more emphasis put on emissions reduction by industrialized countries. The 
protocol established a legally binding cap for the amount of GHG which a participating country 
can emit in a given year. Flexibility was given to participants as to the methods in which they 
would meet their objectives. Three flexibility mechanisms were introduced in order to assist 
participants: clean development, emissions trading, and joint implementation. The clean 
development mechanism allows industrialized countries to invest in cleaner practices in 
developing countries as a substitute for reduction in their own country. Emissions trading allows 
countries to trade pollution rights between each other so that a country which has surpassed its 
required reduction can trade the rights to another country that is having difficulty meeting their 
objective. Finally, joint implementation allows for industrialized countries to invest in cleaner 
practices in other industrialized countries in other to offset their excess emissions. The frame 
work for the Protocol was designed to address the issue of aggregate global pollution and not as 
a means to target specific countries. However in order for the protocol to be effective in the 
aggregate, it is important that the industrial countries with the highest emission rates participate. 
The United States declined to participate over fears of economic consequences. It is very 
difficult to reach the objective of significantly reducing global emissions with the U.S. not 
participating in the Kyoto Protocol. The importance of U.S. involvement in reducing global 
GHG emissions has lead to mounting political pressures from both within and outside the U.S. 
for them to become committed to some form of emissions reduction plan. 





3.4 Possible Approaches to  Emission Reduction 
Fear of economic consequences are said to be the main reason for the U.S. not 
participating in the Kyoto Protocol. However with the proper policy in place, a government can 
successfully reduce emissions without having a harmful effect on the economy. There are 
generally three policies considered when dealing with pollution reduction and the economy: 
Regulation of a firm’s pollution output (command and control), a pollution tax (Pigouvian tax), 
and a cap and trade system (Stavins,1998). Under a command and control, governments are able 
to restrict the amount of pollution firms emit by either requiring them to practice cleaner 
methods of production or by reducing output. Although this approach can be effective in 
reducing individual firm’s emissions it can have negative effects on the economy. Controlling 
the amount that a firm can pollute will either increase costs to the firm, as they are now required 
to invest in cleaner practices, or require the firm to decrease output in order to meet the standard. 
In either case the end result will be an increase of the price of the goods in the market, decreasing 
social welfare.  Under a Pigouvian tax, firms are taxed on the amount of pollution they emit. 
Although this technique holds firms accountable for their emissions it does not address the need 
for a reduction in aggregate emissions. If a firm found that it was more profitable to increase 
production and in turn increase emissions, paying a high rate of tax, rather than reduce emissions 
and pay less tax, then we might actually see an increase in emissions. The cost of the tax to the 
firm has potential to eventually be passed on to the consumer therefore resulting in higher prices 
in the market and not really holding firm’s accountable for their emissions. A pollution tax is 
more of a revenue generating technique for the government then a method in which to reduce 
emissions, since firms may simply see it as paying for the right to pollute and may even result in 
increased emissions. Under a cap and trade system, firms are designated emission allowances 
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based on a certain bench mark. Allowances can either be used to account for the firm’s own 
emissions or can be sold to other firms in order to meet objectives. The cap and trade system is 
designed to address the problem of aggregate pollution by capping emissions for the entire 
market and then dividing it amongst firms. Under cap and trade, firms are able to apply the 
method they feel the most economical in order to achieve their target. Firms that feel the best 
method is to invest in cleaner practices and reduce emission amounts can do so. In fact a firm 
that is able to reduce emissions beyond their target can sell their excess allowances to firms in 
need. A firm that is unable to meet the reduction requirement can purchase allowances in the 
market rather than pay the penalty for exceeding the target amount. The cap and trade system 
addresses the problem of a need for aggregate reduction in emissions, while allowing firms the 
right to choose the most efficient method in meeting their requirement and therefore having 
minimal impact on the economy. The cap and trade system has proven to be fairly successful on 
several different occasions, including various climate exchange markets that have emerged 
throughout Europe in response to the Kyoto Protocol (Sandor et al. 2001) as well as an sulphur 
dioxide cap and trade market that proved to be very effective in reducing  emissions in the 
U.S. as a response to the Clean Air Act Amendment of the 1990’s. 
This thesis examines how a voluntary GHG reduction program in the U.S., such as the 
Chicago Climate Exchange, can work to mitigate mounting pressures on firms to reduce their 
amounts of GHG emissions. As global warming and it’s relation to GHG emissions becomes a 
more prevalent concern, firms under various forms of political threats related to the issue might 





4 Reductions Markets 
4.1 Market for Sulphur Dioxide Reduction 
In 1852 a chemist named Robert Angus Smith released research discussing the impact that 
the industrial revolution was already having on the natural environment (Senanayake et al., 2005; 
Clark et al., 2001). His work at this time was focused on the effect that the increase in the release 
of sulphur dioxide ( and nitrogen dioxide ) into the atmosphere would have on air 
quality. He suggested that the release of these gases into the atmosphere would lead to an 
increase in the pH levels of rain and ultimately have a negative impact on the environment. 
Although Smith had made this discovery during the industrial revolution, it wasn’t until over 100 
years later that the problem really began to be investigated in detail by scientists. In the late 
1960’s concern began to grow over the impact that this pollution was having on the environment. 
It was around this time that the term acid rain was presented to describe the phenomenon. Heavy 
polluting countries began to develop possible solutions to the problem of acid rain. One solution 
involved creating high rising smoke stacks which would allow for the  to be dispersed into 
the air and spread out over a wider area. Since  is a relatively heavier gas when using short 
stacks, the gas remains in the area in which it was released, thus having a greater impact on the 
immediate surroundings. Although the solution of higher stacks would work in keeping heavy 
polluting cities relatively cleaner, it was having a harmful effect on surrounding areas. The U.S. 
government found that it was necessary to take action on the issue of acid rain. The solution 
involved requiring a reduction in  emissions and not simply permitting pollution to be 
dispersed over a larger area. In 1990 the U.S. government introduced a reform to the Clean Air 
15 
 
Act of the 1970s by developing a system of emissions trading in which polluters would be 
required to cap and reduce their  emissions. The Clean Air Act Amendment
3
 of 1990 
introduced the Acid Rain Program (Title IV) which consisted of a two phase program which 
focused on the reduction of  emissions by major power plants. Phase I would begin in 1995 
and continue through until the end of 1999. Phase I participants consisted mainly of large power 
plants, in which allowances were based on previous emissions rates requiring a relative reduction 
in each year. Phase II expanded participation to all power plants with a significant level of 
output. Caps and reductions for Phase II were structured similar to Phase I.  
The idea behind the market was to internalize the cost of  emissions to the firm by 
holding them accountable for their level of emissions, where as previously the costs of the 
emissions were external to the firm and came in the form of acid rain, ultimately being paid by 
the societies it affected. The decision on how the reduction target would be met was left up to the 
firm itself. If a firm felt that it would be more cost effective to install newer technologies in order 
to meet their reduction objective then they could do so and could possibly even profit from 
reducing emissions beyond the requirement. Firms that were able to make a reduction in 
emissions below their cap would be left with excess allowances which could either be sold 
in the market or banked for future use. It must be noted that although firms could bank and use 
allowances from the previous year, they could not use allowances from future years to meet the 
requirements of the current year. Firms that were unable to meet the required cap in a certain 
year had the option to either use allowances which they have banked from previous years or 
purchase the needed allowances from firms with an excess. Failure to meet the required cap by 





reducing emissions, using banked allowances or purchasing allowances, would result in a penalty 
to the firm in the form of a fine
4
. The penalty for failing to make the required reductions does not 
excuse a firm’s excess emissions but rather, in addition to a fine, the firm is required to make 
additional future reductions as compensation. The cap and trade system for emissions was 
found to be effective in addressing both environmental and economic concerns. By capping the 
aggregate amount of emissions in the market and allowing firms to trade emissions rights, total 
 emissions in the U.S. are reduced and not simply that of a few firms. In addition, the fact 
that firms were given the freedom to make the decision on how to go about meeting the required 
emission reduction, rather than having a method imposed through regulation, made it possible 
for the firm to make the decision which they deemed to be the most cost effective, resulting in 
minimal economic impact. 
Stavins (1998) examined the effectiveness of the U.S.  allowance trading market as a 
method in which emissions can be reduced while having minimal impact on firm value. He 
argues that the market based approach to reducing emissions can be far more cost effective 
to firms when compared against the more commonly used command-and-control method. The 
trend in using command-and-control methods is found to be rooted in a political framework 
rather than one of economics, leading legislators to often overlook the possibility of an 
allowance market as means to reduce emission rates. At the time when Stavins wrote his paper, 
the  allowance-trading market had only been fully binding for 3 years, and he cautioned on 
drawing concrete conclusion on results from such a short time period. However, that preliminary 
analysis indicates that  allowance-trading market was successful in meeting  reduction in 
                                                          
4
 2004 fine rates were $2,727 per ton of   above the required reduction.  
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a cost effective manner. Stavins attributes the success of the  allowance-trading market to a 
variety of factors: the political support of the Bush administration, the design of the market as a 
method to reduce emissions and not simply reallocate them, the design process that set the 
emission reductions objectives and then deliberated on the cost effective methods in which to 
achieve them, and the fact that  emissions were previously unregulated allowed for the 
market to come in effect and operate freely without any additional constraints. The allowance-
trading program for  emissions was successful at meeting required emissions reduction 
targets, while keeping reduction costs significantly lower than more traditionally used 
environmental regulations (Kanwalroop, 1999).  
4.2 Market for Carbon Dioxide Reduction 
The lack of commitment by the U.S. government to participate in GHG emission 
reduction initiatives has resulted in growing demand for some form of GHG emissions 
regulation. In response to this growing demand various programs have developed throughout the 
U.S. in which firms can participate on a voluntary basis and work towards developing more 
environmentally friendly business practices. One notable program is the Chicago Climate 
Exchange (CCX). The CCX is the only climate exchange market in North America that had 
markets for all six of the major GHGs, with  being its main one. The structure of the CCX is 
very similar to that of the earlier market for  reduction and  markets found in Europe. 
Participating members of the CCX commit to reducing their GHG emissions scheduled on a 
predetermined baseline. Emissions rights that are traded on the CCX are called Carbon Financial 
Instruments (CFIs) and can be traded amongst members.  Members who surpass their required 
reduction have the option of either banking their CFIs or selling them to members who are 
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unable to meet their required reduction. The CCX is composed of three parts main parts: the 
CCX registry, the trading platform, and the clearing and settlement platform. What is unique 
about the CCX is that it operates in a country without any formal regulation of  emissions, 
making it a voluntary market. But, although the market is voluntary all commitments are legally 
binding, which simulates a situation in which the firm would be legally bound to reduction 
requirements if legislation were introduced.  
5. The Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX) 
The Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX) began in 2000 with a series of grants from the 
Joyce Foundation to the Kellogg Graduate School of Management at Northwestern University. 
The grants were established in order to provide Professor Richard Sandor with the necessary 
funding to examine and design a possible cap and trade market for green house gas emissions in 
the United States. The objective of the project was to address the lack of government regulation 
towards the growing problems related GHG emissions in the United States though the 
development of a voluntary cap and trade market for GHG emissions. The design process began 
in 2001 and continued through 2002. Trading began in 2003 with 13 initial members on an 
annual emissions reduction schedule. Membership grew quickly and eventually topped 400. All 
members were subject to emissions verification by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, 
Inc. (FINRA) formally the North American Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD) and were legally 
required to meet their reduction commitment. Members met their required emissions reduction 
by either reducing current emissions to the required level or purchased carbon financial 
instruments (CFIs) in the market place. The following is a summary of the CCX registry, the 
CCX trading platform, the dynamics of the CFIs and the various membership categories. 
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The CCX registry was an online registry designed to facilitate the management of 
member’s accounts. Each member had a registry account in which they could manage their GHG 
emissions inventories, manage their CFIs, search and review trades and allowances, review 
member statements and view member only information. In order to track all transaction on the 
CCX each GHG allowance was given a specific serial number on the registry account, this was 
used primarily to track transaction and prevent double counting of emission offsets.  
The Carbon Financial Instrument is what was traded on the CCX. The CFI contract was 
equivalent to 100 metric tons of , which can be in the form of carbon dioxide ( ), methane 
( ), nitrous oxide ( ), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluocarbons (PFCs) and sulphur 
hexafluoride ( ).  Conversions of non-  GHGs follow the standards established by the 
IPCC in order to obtain the  equivalent. Each firm was designated a certain level of 
emissions allowances in the form of CFIs. The CFI could be banked towards future years of 
compliance; however, members could not use future year CFIs to comply with an earlier year. 
CFIs were traded on the CCX’s electronic trading platform, in which offers to buy, sell and 
accept took place. All trades were provided with price transparency, anonymity, and were 
guaranteed through CCX’s clearing and settlement. The CFI contracts exchanged between CCX 
registry account holders occurred on the same day and were generally delivered on a FIFO basis, 
where settlement occurred on the next business day for banking purposes. Short selling by 
registry account members was not permitted; however the CCX had implemented lending 
facilities in order to provide professional traders with the possibility to accommodate short 




5.1 Membership Categories 
The CCX was composed of several different types of membership categories, each of 
which played a different role. These included public corporations, private corporations, 
universities, states, municipalities and a variety of other organizations. All membership 
categories are outlined in the following pages, with emphasis put on the legal requirements of the 
member and how these requirements are satisfied. 
Registry Members 
Members were firms and other entities that had direct GHG emissions and made a legally 
binding commitment with the CCX to reduce emissions based on a predetermined reduction 
schedule. The reduction schedule is as shown below, with phase lengths lasting four years. 
Members were committed for the length of the phase in which they join and can either commit 
for another phase or withdraw from the CCX program once the phase in which they are currently 












Phase I Baseline was based on the average annual emissions from 1998 – 2001. Phase II 
Baseline was based on the average annual emissions from 1998 – 2001 or the single year 2000. 
Members make legally binding commitment to reduce emissions following this baseline. 
Members who fail to meet their reductions are required to purchase CFIs in the markets in order 
to offset excess emissions.  
Registry Participant Members 
Registry Participant Members were members with direct GHG emissions who had yet to 
make a commitment to reducing emissions in a specific year, but had agreed to undergo 
verification of their current GHG emission quantities. Registry Participant Members established 
a CCX registry account and submitted a minimum of one year worth of complete emissions data, 
which was then independently verified by FINRA. Future years of GHG emissions were then 
                                                          
5
 Source: www.chicagoclimatex.com 
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verified and recorded on the online registry account. Although Registry Participant Members did 
not participate in the reduction commitment and market for CFIs as Members do, by establishing 
a registry account they facilitated the process of becoming a Member if the decision was made 
and the independent verification by FINRA allows them to better respond to future government 
regulation. 
Associate Members 
Associate members consisted of entities with negligible direct emissions however did 
have relevant indirect emissions in the form of business energy consumption and relative travel 
emissions. Associate Members made a legally binding commitment to reduce or offset all of 
their indirect emissions from the year they join through 2010. Indirect emissions could be offset 
through the purchase and retirement of CFIs in the CCX market place. In order to entirely offset 
annual emissions, an Associate Members had to purchase the necessary quantity of CFIs 
associated with the emissions levels and then retire them for each given year. Associate 
Members were required to submit annual indirect emissions reports to the CCX to be verified by 
FINRA. In terms of the CCX market, Associate Members acted as a demand side economic 
agent through their required purchase of CFIs in order to offset annual emissions. 
Offset Providers & Offset Aggregators 
The Offset Providers membership category consisted of owners of offset projects which 
sequestered, destroyed or reduced GHG emissions, whereas the Offset Aggregators members 
acted as agents between smaller offset project owners and the CCX. Offset Aggregators did so 
by grouping together small projects and presenting them as a larger single offset project and 
were therefore subject to the same rules and regulations as offset providers. These projects 
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address issues related to deforestation as mentioned in section 3.2. Offset Projects were rewarded 
with the issuing of CFIs which could be traded on the CCX market and were awarded on a 
retroactive basis to the year in which the project took place. In order to maintain consistency and 
integrity of project compensation, all projects were rewarded on a predetermined scale and were 
weighted appropriately to the size of the offset project.  Guidelines for qualifying sequestering, 
destruction and reduction projects are clearly outlined by the CCX and follow those established 
by IPCC in 2007. In order for an offset project to qualify the offset provider or aggregator had to 
first qualify as a CCX member, any offset member with an annual emissions rate greater than 
10,000 metric tons of equivalent had to also register as a CCX Member and were subject to 
the emissions reduction schedule as previously outlined. This requirement ensured that an offset 
provider did not benefit from an offset project while continuing with high levels of emissions 
elsewhere. In order to avoid possible double counting of offset projects, the CCX made a list of 
all Offset Projects associated with it publicly available and verified other registries for possible 
double counting before approving the project. Offset Providers and Offset Aggregators acted as 
supply side agents in terms of the CCX market, bringing new CFIs to the marketplace once a 
project has been reviewed and approved.  
Liquidity Providers 
The Liquidity Providers joined the CCX with the intent of trading CFIs for financial gain 
and did not make a reductions requirement commitment. Types of Liquidity Providers that joined 
the CCX included market makers, commodity trading advisors, proprietary trading groups, hedge 
funds and local traders. Since Liquidity Providers were not required to make any reduction 
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commitment and joined the CCX simply for trading purposes their economic implications are 
rather limited in terms of this study. 
Exchange Participants 
Exchange Providers were entities that joined the CCX with the intentions of purchasing 
CFIs and permanently retiring them. They included businesses, organizations and individuals 
who wished to offset emissions for an event or activity and did so by purchasing the relevant 
amount of CFIs and permanently retiring them. The Exchange Providers were subject to 
enrolment fees and annual dues for each year in which they maintain their registry account. CFIs 
could be purchased at any time at the prevailing market price. In an economic context, Exchange 
Providers can be viewed as demand side agents where once an event or activity takes place the 
Exchange Providers return to the market to purchase CFIs and retire them, thus reducing the 
overall amount of CFIs in the market place. 
5.2 Non-Compliance Costs 
The failure to meet a required target reduction could be fairly costly to a firm. Costs varied 
between the magnitude of which the target was missed and the CFI prices, which the firm was 
required to purchase to make up the difference. The following outlines a hypothetical example in 
which a firm is unable to meet target reductions. American Electric Power (AEP) is used in this 
example providing actual baseline and target reductions. We explore situations where AEP 
hypothetically missed targets by 10%, 25%, and 50% and provide total costs of purchasing CFIs 
at the yearly low, median, high prices.  
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AEP Baseline : 154,621,848
6
 Tons of  





Tons of  
2003 1.00% 153,075,630 
2004 2.00% 151,529,412 
2005 3.00% 149,983,193 
2006 4.00% 148,436,975 
2007 4.25% 148,050,420 
2008 4.50% 147,663,866 
2009 5.00% 146,890,756 
2010 6.00% 145,344,538 
American Electric Power’s actual  emission reduction 




Table 2. CFI Prices
7
 
 Year Low Median High 
2003 $0.98 $0.98 $1.00 
2004 $0.73 $0.96 $1.80 
2005 $1.16 $1.77 $3.24 
2006 $1.50 $4.00 $4.85 
2007 $1.70 $3.50 $4.15 
2008 $1.10 $3.90 $7.40 
2009 $0.10 $0.73 $2.35 
2010 $0.05 $0.10 $0.15 




                                                          
6
 Source: www.aep.com/environmental/reports 
7
 Source: www.chicagoclimatex.com 
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Table 3.1. Non-Compliance Costs: Missing Target By 10% 
    
Non-Compliance Cost 
 
Tons of  Required CFIs 
 
Low Median High 
2003    15,307,563  153,076 
 
$150,014.12 $150,014.12 $153,075.63 
2004    15,152,941  151,529 
 
$110,616.47 $145,468.24 $272,752.94 
2005    14,998,319  149,983 
 
$173,980.50 $265,470.25 $485,945.55 
2006    14,843,697  148,437 
 
$222,655.46 $593,747.90 $719,919.33 
2007    14,805,042  148,050 
 
$251,685.71 $518,176.47 $614,409.24 
2008    14,766,386  147,664 
 
$162,430.25 $575,889.08 $1,092,712.61 
2009    14,689,075 146,891 
 
$14,689.08 $106,495.80 $345,193.28 
2010    14,534,453  145,345 
 
$7,267.23 $14,534.45 $21,801.68 
Hypothetical non-compliance costs where AEP was 10% above their reduction targets. Tons of  represents 
the amount of emissions in which they exceed the target. Required CFIs are the numberof CFIs which must be 
purchased in order to offset the excess emissions. Non-compliance costs are the total costs of the required CFIs, 
based on prices outlined in table 2. 
 
Table 3.2. Non-Compliance Costs: Missing Target By 25% 
   
Non-Compliance Cost 
 
Tons of  Required CFIs Low Median High 
2003    38,268,907 382,689 $375,035.29 $375,035.29 $382,689.08 
2004    37,882,352  378,824 $276,541.18 $363,670.59 $681,882.35 
2005    37,495,798 374,958 $434,951.26 $663,675.63 $1,214,863.87 
2006    37,109,243  371,092 $556,638.66 $1,484,369.75 $1,799,798.32 
2007    37,012,605  370,126 $629,214.29 $1,295,441.18 $1,536,023.11 
2008    36,915,966  369,160 $406,075.63 $1,439,722.69 $2,731,781.51 
2009    36,722,689 367,227 $36,722.69 $266,239.50 $862,983.19 
2010    36,336,134  363,361 $18,168.07 $36,336.13 $54,504.20 
Hypothetical non-compliance costs where AEP was 25% above their reduction targets. 
 
Table 3.3. Non-Compliance Costs: Missing Target By 50% 
   
Non-Compliance Cost 
 
Tons of  Required CFIs Low Median High 
2003    79,000,000  790,000 $774,200.00 $774,200.00 $790,000.00 
2004    73,500,000 735,000 $536,550.00 $705,600.00 $1,323,000.00 
2005    73,232,480  732,325 $849,496.77 $1,296,214.90 $2,372,732.35 
2006    71,261,043 712,610 $1,068,915.66 $2,850,441.75 $3,456,160.62 
2007    78,150,000  781,500 $1,328,550.00 $2,735,250.00 $3,243,225.00 
2008    74,084,000 740,840 $814,924.00 $2,889,276.00 $5,482,216.00 
2009    64,857,350 648,573 $64,857.35 $470,215.79 $1,524,147.72 
2010    67,000,000  670,000 $33,500.00 $67,000.00 $100,500.00 




This example demonstrates that the cost of failing to meet a required reduction could be 
fairly high. Costs fluctuate significantly with the magnitude of missing the target and the CFI 
price. Here we see that missing the reduction target by 50% when the CFI prices are high could 
have costs AEP $5.5million in 2008. Unlike initiatives which are not legally binding, CCX firms 
face uncertainty as to costs. The legally binding nature, as well as the potential high cost of non-
compliance, of the CCX demonstrates that firms who decide to join are making a more definitive 
statement about their commitment to emission reductions. 
5.3 The End of The CCX 
In November 2010 the Chicago Climate Exchange announced that they would closing 
down. Lack of government regulation on issues related to GHG emissions has been cited as one 
of the main reasons for the collapse of the CCX. Yang (2006) argues that, although the cap and 
trade system used by the CCX is an effective way to control emission rates, without proper 
government regulation these types of markets will have a hard time being entirely effective. In 
his book, Prof. Sandor outlines the collapse of the CCX and it’s relation to the unwillingness of 
the U.S. government to introduce proper legislation on the matter. Professor Sandor draws a link 
between fluctuations in CFI price and political endorsement of the CCX, with CFI prices 
reaching a record high of $7.40 in 2008 after endorsements by Democratic candidates Hilary 
Clinton and Barack Obama, as well as Senator John McCain. As political interest and support of 
the CCX began to fade the prices of CFIs began to drop, reaching a record low of $0.05 per CFI 
in 2010. Dr Sandor recognizes that the collapse of the CCX does not indicate that the market was 
a complete failure. Rather, the experience presented that a fully functioning cap and trade market 
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in which GHG emission rights can be traded is possible. With participation of over 400 members 
and support from some powerful politicians the CCX demonstrated that there is interested in 
such a cap and trade market.  
6. Why Corporate Social Responsibility?  
Kitzmueller and Shimshack (2012) outline factors that might motivate a firm to 
ostensibly become more socially responsible, including market and politic avenues. For the 
purpose of this study greater attention will be given to the politics avenue and how it relates to 
the decision to participate in the CCX. The following outlines the markets and politics avenues 
discussed by Kitmueller and Shimshack, and provides their relationship to CSR. 
6.1 Market Determinants of Corporate Social Responsibility 
Both labour and product markets may motivate firms. Labour markets are considered to 
influence a firm’s decision to undertake CSR investments through the desire to align the 
employer’s interests with those of their employees. By aligning the interests of both parties, 
employees are better able to identify with the organization in which they work and by doing so 
increase their satisfaction within the organization. In a study comparing workers of non-profit 
organizations with workers of for-profit organizations it is found that workers have a preference 
for social good and will often trade wages in turn for higher social good (Preston 1989). Higher 
levels of CSR activity by the organization will result in the willingness of workers to accept a 
higher wage differential, indicating that workers gain utility from social good through CSR. 
Besley and Ghatak (2005) find that higher worker utility derived from the employer being 
involved with social good will often result in greater worker motivation. This relationship 
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between CSR and worker motivation allows firms to screen for more highly motivated workers 
through CSR (Brekke and Nyborg, 2008). Furthermore, Davis, Whitman and Zald (2008) 
suggest that higher worker satisfaction through the use of CSR might be a method in which firms 
can discourage possible unionization attempts. 
 In addition to the labour markets benefits, firms with higher CSR ratings can gain from 
increased demand of CSR produced goods in the market place. Baron (2008) finds that 
management can align their incentives with demands for social responsible goods and thus 
increase their profitability. In competitive markets CSR firms are able to benefit from increased 
utility to consumers of CSR produced goods by separating from non-CSR firms. In the case 
where government regulation requires firms to meet a certain level of compliance higher quality 
firms will distinguish themselves with over compliance, where the lower quality firm will find it 
difficult to meet the required compliance levels (Besley and Ghatak, 2007). This separation will 
allow for consumers to more easily distinguish between the two different qualities of firms.  
6.2 Political Threats As a Determinant of Corporate Social Responsibility 
Kitzmueller and Shimshack (2012) distinguish between public and private threats. Public 
political threats consist of threats brought on by government intervention, either through 
legislation or regulation. Private political threats come from activists or non government 
organizations. Private politic, threats are brought on by boycotts, lawsuits and demonstrations. 
The effectiveness of private political threats in obtaining a response from the firm depends on a 
variety factors. Baron (2002) outlines a theoretical framework for the effectiveness of boycotts, 
the private politic agents that introduce them and the firms that are targeted. The main arguments 
suggest that the effectiveness of boycotts depends on the reputation or strength of the activist, the 
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characteristics of the target firm (industry concentration, brand value, reputation etc.) and the 
legitimacy or urgency of the boycott issue (Eesley & Lenox 2006). The private political threats 
derive from the concerns of citizens on a certain social issue, and the boycott can be seen as a 
mechanism in which these concerns are brought to the attention of the target firms (Eesley & 
Lenox 2006, Baron 2009). Baron (2002) also argues that potential target firms need not wait 
until a private political threat is in place and a proactive approach by potential target can actually 
be favourable to the firm in terms of opinions of the general public.  
Public political threats also derive from concerns of citizens. However, in the case of the 
public political threats it is through government intervention through forms of regulation and 
legislation that the concerns are brought to the attention of the firms. When considering the 
political landscape of the U.S. we can consider Republican and Democrat states as a framework 
for the different demands of their citizens. In a study on the relationship between political 
orientation and social issues in the U.S., Leiserowitz et al. (2011) find that citizens who 
associated themselves with democrat political party tend to be more concerned with social issues 
related to environmental issues, such as global warming, when compared with citizens who 
associate themselves with republican parties. In fact, there is found to be a negative correlation 
between conservative politics (republican) and support for CSR (Liston-Heyes and Creton, 
2007). The findings related to political orientation of citizens and the relative support of CSR 
support from political parties might suggest that firms who are located in democratic states might 
face greater public political threats then  those in republican states.  
 In this study, I examine whether implicit political threats motivated companies to join the 
Chicago Climate Exchange, and whether the stock market’s reaction around the time a company 
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announced its joining is associated with such threats. Sierra Club Membership and KLD 
Rankings are used as proxies for political threats. Sierra Club is a highly influential grassroots 
organization originating in the U.S. and currently contains over 1.4 million members in the U.S. 
alone. The organization is a community of activists who seek to increase welfare through social 
responsibility initiatives. Initiatives include lobbying governments, boycotts, educating on social 
issue, as well as many others. KLD Rankings provide a look at which firms might be more likely 
to face some form of political threat. It is possible to make the assumption that a firm with higher 
rankings for community and environmental strengths would be less likely to face political threats 
than a firm with lower strength rankings. In addition, we could assume that firms with higher 
ranking for community and environmental concerns would be more likely to face political threats 












7. Data and Sample Selection 
The following section outlines the criteria used in creating a CCX sample and a comparison 
sample. It also includes a summary of financial, industry and environmental characteristics of 
both samples. The sample of CCX firms is composed of companies which were listed as 
members on the CCX, are publicly traded, and for which an exact announcement date for their 
intentions to join the CCX was identifiable through searches on Factiva and Lexis-Nexis. There 
are 34 CCX members that meet these criteria a. A comparison sample is composed of firms 
which are listed on the S&P500 Composite Index and share the same 4-digit SIC code as the 
CCX firms. Comparison sample data is matched to the announcement year of the respective 












7.1 Financial and Industry Summary Statistics 
Table 1 presents financial and industry characteristics of both CCX sample and comparison 
sample firms, where All Firms represents CCX and Matching samples combined. Sales, Market 
Value of Equity and Price to Book data are all collected from Compustat, with Year -1 and Year 
0 signifying the year prior to the announcement and the year of the announcement respectively. 
The Herfindahl index represents industry concentration and is calculated as   , 
where  is the total sales of firm  in the announcement year and  is total number of firms for 
industry j.  
Table 4. Summary of Financial and Industry Characteristics of Sample Firms 
 





Sales Year -1 ($ million) 










Sales Year 0 ($ million) 










Price to Book Year -1 










Price to Book Yr-0 










Market Cap Yr-1 ($ million) 










Market Cap Yr-0 ($ million) 





















CCX represents the 34 firm sample that have joined the CCX, comparison represents the 75 firm comparison 
sample, all firms represents both samples combined. HHI represents Herfindahl industry concentration index.  
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Mean sales for the CCX firms are double that of the comparison sample for both year 
prior and year of, with medians still being significantly higher for both years. Price to book ratios 
are higher for the CCX firms, for both year of and year prior, when compared against the 
comparison sample. The higher price to book ratios suggests that CCX firms have greater growth 
potential in relation to the comparison firms. Mean market cap is much larger for CCX firms in 
relation to the comparison sample, indicating that on average CCX firms are larger. However, 
median market caps for both years are smaller for the CCX firms, suggesting that there is a 
greater variety of firm sizes for the CCX firms versus comparison firms. The CCX firm sample 
contains some very large companies which are driving the mean results. The Herfindahl index 
means suggest that the CCX firms come from moderately concentrated industries, where the 
non-CCX firms tend to come from fairly un-concentrated industries. The HHI median for CCX 
firms is much smaller than the mean (median = 0.09473vs. mean =0.189446), suggesting that that 
there are some firms from highly concentrated industries in the sample and then others from 
fairly un-concentrated industries.  
Table 4’s overall results suggest that on average the CCX firms tend to be much larger, have 
greater growth potential and come from more highly concentrated industries than the non-CCX 
firms. 
7.2 Environmental Summary Statistics 
Environmental performance data is collected from the Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini 
Research & Analytics (KLD) database. KLD provides binary coding for firm’s strengths and 
weaknesses on a variety of social issues, with 1 indicating if the strength or weakness is present 
and 0 indicating its absence.  Table 5 presents the KLD ratings for strengths and concerns on 
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Environmental, Corporate Governance and Community issues for the announcement year. This 
table also provides the ratio of Sierra club membership per 1000 population of the state in which 
the firm is headquartered during the announcement year. 
Table 5. Summary of Environmental Characteristics of Sample Firms 
  
All Firms (n=109) CCX (n= 34) Matching (n=75) 
KLD No. of Environmental Concerns 
        Mean 
 
1.439252 1.46875 1.426667 
    Median 
 
1 1 1 
KLD Environmental Concerns Regulatory Problems 
        Mean 
 
0.364486 0.4375 0.333333 
    Median 
 
0 0 0 
KLD Environmental Concerns Substantial Emissions 
        Mean 
 
0.392523 0.4375 0.373333 
    Median 
 
0 0 0 
KLD No. of Environmental Strengths 
        Mean 
 
0.691589 0.90625 0.6 
    Median 
 
0 1 0 
KLD Environmental Strengths Pollution Prevention 
        Mean 
 
0.093458 0.1875 0.053333 
    Median 
 
0 0 0 
KLD No. of Corporate Governance Concerns 
        Mean 
 
0.682243 0.6875 0.68 
    Median 
 
1 1 1 
KLD No. of Corporate Governance Strengths 
        Mean 
 
0.364486 0.40625 0.346667 
    Median 
 
0 0 0 
KLD No. of Community Concerns 
        Mean 
 
0.336449 0.40625 0.306667 
    Median 
 
0 0 0 
KLD No. of Community Strengths 
        Mean 
 
0.457944 0.59375 0.4 
    Median 
 
0 0 0 
Sierra Club Membership per 1000 HQ State Pop. 
        Mean 
 
2.377064 2.101494 2.501989 
    Median 
 
1.831058 1.7665 1.858412 
CCX represents the 34 firm sample that have joined the CCX, comparison represents the 75 firm comparison sample, all firms 
represents both samples combined.  KLD rankings are provided by Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini Research & Analytics. KLD 




KLD ratings rank CCX firms as having slightly higher environmental concerns then the non-
CCX firms, with means for both regulatory problems and substantial emissions being higher for 
the CCX sample. However, CCX firms also out do the comparison firms in number of 
environmental strengths present (0.9 vs. 0.6), with high ratings in the area of pollution 
prevention. Both the CCX and comparison samples perform similarly in areas of corporate 
governance concerns, as well as corporate governance strengths.  CCX firms face slightly higher 
community concerns than their counterparts, but adjust for this with an even higher performance 
in the area of community strengths. Sierra club membership per 1000 HQ state population means 
and medians indicate that the comparison sample firms are headquartered in states with a higher 
membership participation rate than CCX firms. This finding suggests that the comparison sample 
of non-CCX firms might face greater political threats related to environmental and community 
concerns then their CCX counterparts 
 
8. Event Study 
8.1 Abnormal Returns 
In order to estimate market reaction to the announcement of a firm joining the CCX, 
abnormal returns are calculated for several event windows around the announcement date. Exact 
announcement dates are confirmed through searches on Factiva and Lexis-Nexis. Returns are 
collected from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database.  Cumulative 
Abnormal Returns (CARs) are calculated for firm  as  =  – 1, where  is the 
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day relative to the announcement day ( ),  is firm ’s return and  is the market return. 
Table 6 uses S&P Composite index as the market return.
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Table 6. Cumulative Abnormal Returns Around Announcement Date 
Window No. of days CARs > 0 Mean p-value Median p-value 
Day -60 to -6 55 9 0.0468 0.1750 0.0432     0.0402** 
Day -5 to 5 11 14 0.0211   0.0824* 0.0118 0.1043 
Day -4 1 15 0.0064 0.1885 0.0003 0.4417 
Day -3 1 18 -0.0030 0.3604 -0.0016 0.6567 
Day -2 1 20 0.0022 0.4236 -0.0012 0.9455 
Day -1 1 19 0.0003 0.9014 -0.0011 0.8241 
Day 0 1 13 0.0035 0.2055 0.0029 0.2120 
Day 1 1 15 -0.0001 0.9815 0.0036 0.5843 
Day -5 to 1 7 12 0.0108 0.2033 0.0083 0.1824 
Day -1 to 1 3 12 0.0050 0.5337 0.0051 0.2739 
Day 2 to 10 9 21 -0.0018 0.8101 -0.0116 0.4316 
Day 11 to 60 50 19 -0.0398 0.2344 -0.0192 0.3214 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) are calculated for firm  as  =  – 1, where  is the day 
relative to the announcement day ( ),  is firm ’s return and  is the market return. S&P Composite index 
is used as market return.  ** and * indicate significance at the 5% and 10% level, respectively, using t-test for 
means and Wilcoxin  signed-ranks for medians. 
 
CCX firms outperform the market in the days leading up to the event date. More 
specifically, the 55 day window between day – 60 to -6 shows a mean CAR of 0.0468 and a 
median of 0.0432, indicating that in the months leading up to the announcement of the firm 
joining the CCX the firms are outperforming the S&P Composite Index. Performance slows 
down as we approach the announcement day, with individual day CAR means and medians 
approaching 0 around the announcement and for the event window -5 to 1 we find a mean of 
0.0108 (median =0.0083). CCX firms underperform the market index in the days preceding the 
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 Additional results supporting table 6 are available in the appendix. Table A2 Provides CARs using value weighted 
portfolio including all distributions as market index. Table A3 Provides CARs using equally weighted portfolio 




announcement. Event window Day 2 to 10 demonstrates a mean CAR of -0.0018 (median -
0.0116) and window Day 11 to 60 a mean of -0.0398 (median= -0.0192), indicating that the 
announcement of the firm joining the CCX is associated with an underperformance of the CCX 
firms relative to the S&P Composite Index in the following months. This finding suggests that 
investors have a negative view of a firm’s decision to make voluntary and legally binding 
commitment to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by joining the CCX.  
Table 7 presents and ranks individual three day  for the 34 CCX companies. 
 are ranked from most negative to most positive. These CARs are used as dependent 













Table 7. Individual  Ranked by Most Negative To Most Positive 
Company Name Ticker Year  
STMicroelectronics STM 2003 -0.1016 
Avista Corporation AVA 2007 -0.0635 
Boise Inc. BZ 2008 -0.0464 
Abbott ABT 2008 -0.0455 
Motorola, Inc. MOT 2003 -0.0422 
Safeway, Inc. SWY 2006 -0.0364 
PSEG PEG 2009 -0.0271 
Neenah Paper Incorporated  NP 2007 -0.0220 
DuPont DD 2003 -0.0101 
Ford Motor Company F 2003 -0.0032 
Knoll Inc. KNL 2006 -0.0023 
green mountain power GMP 2004 -0.0005 
Duquesne Light Company DQE 2006 0.0023 
Jim Walter Resources Inc. WLT 2007 0.0041 
Temple-Inland Inc TIN 2003 0.0042 
Eastman Kodak Company EK 2007 0.0044 
Baxter International Inc. BAX 2003 0.0050 
Central Vermont Public Service CV 2005 0.0051 
Waste Management Inc. WM 2003 0.0109 
Puget Sound Energy  PSD 2007 0.0129 
IBM IBM 2003 0.0144 
United Technologies Corporation UTX 2004 0.0171 
DTE Energy Inc. DTE 2007 0.0182 
Interface, Inc. IFSIA 2004 0.0186 
TECO Energy, Inc. TE 2004 0.0191 
Bank of America Corporation BAC 2007 0.0199 
International Paper IP 2003 0.0299 
MeadWestvaco Corp. MWV 2003 0.0316 
NRG Power Marketing NRG 2007 0.0382 
Smithfield Foods, Inc. SFD 2007 0.0410 
Intel Corporation INTC 2007 0.0490 
Monsanto Company  MON 2007 0.0520 
American Electric Power AEP 2003 0.0789 
Domtar Corporation UFS 2008 0.0954 
Individual  for the 34 CCX firms.  are ranked from most negative to most 





8.2 Abnormal Trading Volumes 
In addition to the event study abnormal trading volumes for the CCX firms are computed 
around the announcement date. Event window trading volumes are compared against average 
trading volumes for a period of 55 days between day -60 to -6 relative to Day 0 being the 
announcement date. Abnormal trading volumes are computed as the log of the ratio between 
individual firm’s average trading volume over the event window and the average trading volume 
between day -60 to -6. That is, abnormal trading volume for firm is computed as:  = 
 for event window day  to . 
Table 8.  Abnormal Trading Volume Around Announcement Date 
Window No. of days Mean  p-value Median  p-value 
Day -5 to 5 11 0.0573 0.2203 0.0650 0.1462 
Day -4 1 0.0003 0.9970 -0.0297 0.9319 
Day -3 1 0.0180 0.8328 0.0201 0.8241 
Day -2 1 -0.1208 0.1278 -0.0803 0.1043 
Day -1 1 -0.0436 0.5964 -0.0980 0.7976 
Day 0 1 -0.1423   0.0655* -0.1351     0.0493** 
Day 1 1 -0.0215 0.7956 0.0451 0.9183 
Day -5 to 1 7 0.0303 0.5477 0.0233 0.6080 
Day -1 to 1 3 -0.0256 0.6729 -0.0258 0.6080 
Day 2 to 10 9 0.0691 0.2766 0.0650 0.3740 
Day 11 to 60 50 0.0639 0.2045 0.0787 0.2520 
Abnormal trading volumes ( ) are calculated for firm  as  = , for event window 
day  to . ** and * indicate significance at the 5% and 10% level, respectively, using t-test for means and 
Wilcoxin  signed-ranks for medians. 
 
Abnormal volume results indicate an increase in trading during the days leading up to the 
announcement date and a decrease in volume beginning on day -2 and continuing until Day 1, 
with the largest, and only significant, decrease found on day 0 with Mean  = -0.1423 
(Median  = -0.1351). The largest increase in trading volume occurs in the days following the 
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announcement, with event windows day 2 to 10 and day 11 to 60 demonstrating high means and 
medians for . The fluctuations in abnormal volumes reconfirm the finding in the CAR results, 
that investors have a negative reaction to the announcement of a firm’s decision to join the CCX.  
Table 9 presents and ranks individual  for the 34 CCX companies.  are 
ranked from most negative to most positive. These abnormal volumes are used as dependent 















Table 9. Individual  Ranked by Most Negative To Most Positive 
Company Name Ticker Year  
Boise Inc. BZ 2008 -0.7964 
Jim Walter Resources Inc. WLT 2007 -0.7019 
TECO Energy, Inc. TE 2004 -0.4524 
Puget Sound Energy  PSD 2007 -0.4357 
Duquesne Light Company DQE 2006 -0.4149 
Temple-Inland Inc TIN 2003 -0.3856 
Ford Motor Company F 2003 -0.3476 
Central Vermont Public Service CV 2005 -0.2667 
Baxter International Inc. BAX 2003 -0.2556 
green mountain power GMP 2004 -0.2369 
Motorola, Inc. MOT 2003 -0.1777 
Interface, Inc. IFSIA 2004 -0.1041 
Waste Management Inc. WM 2003 -0.0991 
Smithfield Foods, Inc. SFD 2007 -0.0753 
Monsanto Company  MON 2007 -0.0690 
Abbott ABT 2008 -0.0635 
NRG Power Marketing NRG 2007 -0.0435 
American Electric Power AEP 2003 -0.0081 
Safeway, Inc. SWY 2006 -0.0048 
Domtar Corporation UFS 2008 0.0072 
IBM IBM 2003 0.0228 
MeadWestvaco Corp. MWV 2003 0.0508 
Eastman Kodak Company EK 2007 0.0761 
International Paper IP 2003 0.1223 
PSEG PEG 2009 0.1925 
United Technologies Corporation UTX 2004 0.2187 
DTE Energy Inc. DTE 2007 0.2416 
Neenah Paper Incorporated  NP 2007 0.2720 
DuPont DD 2003 0.2937 
STMicroelectronics STM 2003 0.3170 
Knoll Inc. KNL 2006 0.3729 
Intel Corporation INTC 2007 0.3897 
Avista Corporation AVA 2007 0.6435 
Bank of America Corporation BAC 2007 0.8479 
Individual  for the 34 CCX firms.  are ranked from most negative to most 






9.1 Determinants of Abnormal Returns 
Table 10 examines the determinants of CARs around the event window Day -1 to 1, 
using three different OLS regressions. Dependent variables are the CARs for Day -1 to 1 for 
each of 34 firms. Independent variables: sales year -1, price to book Year -1, HHI, Sierra Club 
membership, KLD No. of environmental concerns, KLD No. of environmental strengths, KLD 
No. of community concerns, KLD No. of community strengths are as previously defined. 
Independent variable, stand deviation is the standard deviation of each individual firm’s stock 
price for the period day -60 to -6 relative to the announcement date, CFI Price is the average CFI 
trading price in the 3-month period leading up to announcement date, Factiva Chicago Climate 
Exchange is number of search results using Factiva for “Chicago Climate Exchange” in the 3-
Month period leading up to the announcement date. P-values are in parenthesis, * identifies 














Table 10. Cross-sectional Regressions on CARs Around Day -1 to 1 
  Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 
Intercept -0.0232504 -0.039288 -0.0060341 
 
(0.663) (0.412) (0.882) 
    Log Market Value Year Prior ($ million) 0.0029377 0.002947 0.0015465 
 
(0.672) (0.652) (0.810) 
    Price to book Year -1  -0.0111241 -0.0108518 -0.00977 
 
(0.080*) (0.075*) (0.084*) 
    HHI 0.0070555 0.0126574 -0.0013222 
 
(0.822) (0.668) (0.960) 




















    KLD No. of Environmental Concerns 0.0019215 0.0030354 0.0022199 
 
(0.782) (0.648) (0.733) 
    KLD No. of Environmental Strengths 0.012828 0.0102512 0.012575 
 
(0.106) (0.150) (0.069*) 
    KLD No. of Community Concerns 0.0118473 0.0136958 0.0129931 
 
(0.295) (0.207) (0.229) 
    KLD No. of Community Strengths 0.0036676 0.0019231 0.0016864 
   (0.757)  (0.865) (0.881) 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.0199 0.0704 0.0715 
Coefficient estimates from OLS estimations on  for 34 CCX firms. HHI is the Herfindahl industry 
concentration index, standard deviation is the standard deviation in prices for days -60 to -6, CFI price is the average 
price of CFIs in the 3-month period leading up to the announcement, Factiva Chicago Climate Exchange is number of 
search results using Factiva for “Chicago Climate Exchange” in the 3-Month period leading up to the announcement 




Roughly 7% of the cross-sectional variations in  are explained by the variables in 
regression 3. The only variables found to be significant at the 10% significance level are Price to 
book Year -1 and KLD No. of Environmental Strengths. Price to book value in the year prior to the 
announcement had a negative impact on the , suggesting that perhaps investors might 
view joining the CCX as taking away from potential growth opportunities be allocating resources 
away from positive NPV projects towards emissions reductions projects. KLD rankings for both 
strengths and weaknesses have a positive impact on the abnormal returns, with KLD No. of 
Environmental Strengths having the most positive and only significant impact. Results for KLD 
No. of Environmental Strengths might indicate that investors view firm’s which are already 
recognized as environmental leaders as being more likely to benefit from joining CCX. Results 
for table A4 in the appendix demonstrate similar results as table 7. Roughly 4% cross-sectional 
variations in  are explained by the variables in regression 3 in Table C. Price to book 
value in the year prior to the announcement had a negative impact on the  and was 
significant at the 5% level. Log market value year prior ($ million) was found to be significant at 
the 10% level and demonstrate a positive relationship with the dependent, indicating that larger 
firms experienced more positive abnormal returns around the announcement date. 
 
9.2 Determinants of Abnormal Volumes 
Table 11 replicates Table 10 using  as dependent in place of . All variables are 




Table 11. Cross-sectional Regressions on Abnormal Volume Around Day -1 to 1 
  Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 
Intercept -0.9678109 -0.0202132 -1.029623 
 
(0.107) (0.355) (0.882) 
    Log Market Value Year Prior ($ million) 0.1087626 0.1347407 0.1379882 
 
(0.160) (0.076*) (0.072*) 
    Price to book Year -1  -0.0760412 -0.091126 -0.0539939 
 
(0.262) (0.177) (0.397) 
    HHI 0.3744896 0.256101 0.1077082 
 
(0.281) (0.442) (0.721) 




















    KLD No. of Environmental Concerns -0.0604703 -0.072176 -0.0922253 
 
(0.427) (0.338) (0.227) 
    KLD No. of Environmental Strengths 0.0706989 0.0858033 0.0643071 
 
(0.402) (0.278) (0.408) 
    KLD No. of Community Concerns 0.0700089 0459515 0.0465735 
 
(0.567) (0.702) (0.705) 
    KLD No. of Community Strengths -0.0632321 -0.0685199 -0.0919568 
   (0.625)  (0.591) (0.481) 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.1052 0.0981 0.0473 
Coefficient estimates from OLS estimations on  for 34 CCX firms. HHI is the Herfindahl industry concentration 
index, standard deviation is the standard deviation in prices for days -60 to -6, CFI price is the average price of CFIs in 
the 3-month period leading up to the announcement, Factiva Chicago Climate Exchange is number of search results 
using Factiva for “Chicago Climate Exchange” in the 3-Month period leading up to the announcement date P-values are 




Results indicate that roughly 10% of the cross-sectional variations in  are explained by 
the variables in regression 2. The only variable found to be significant is log of market value year 
prior ($ million), which is significant at the 10% level. The positive result indicates that larger firms 
experience an increase in trading volume around the announcement date. Results for table A5 in 
the appendix demonstrate similar results, with an adjusted r-squared of 0.1701 and results for 
market value year prior ($ million) showing positive and significant results. 
9.3 Probit Regression 
The following table reports probit estimation results for a firm’s decision to join the CCX 
compared against that of the comparison sample of firms who did not join, exploring firm 
characteristics which influence the decision. The CCX Sample consists of 34 firms where the 
comparison sample includes 75 firms listed on the S&P Composite Index with same SIC code 
and years as the CCX sample, for total of 109 companies used in the regression . The dependent 
variable is coded as 1 for CCX sample firms and 0 for firms in the comparison sample. 
Independent variables are as previously defined. P-values are in parenthesis, ** and *** identify 








Table 12. Probit Regression on Decision to Join CCX 
  Intercept 2.400165 
 
(0.064) 
  Log Market Value Year Prior ($ million) -0.3832234 
 
(0.014**) 
  Price to Book Year -1  -0.0500651 
 
(0.361) 
  HHI 5.417945 
 
(0.002***) 
  Sierra Club Membership -0.1636549 
 
(0.134) 
  KLD No. of Environmental Concerns 0.0820295 
 
(0.491) 
  KLD No. of Environmental Strengths 0.246575 
 
(0.158) 
  KLD No. of Community Concerns 0.1723684 
 
(0.579) 
  KLD No. of Community Strengths 0.4228436 
 
(0.046**) 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.2371 
Coefficient estimates for probit regression on the probability that a firm 
joins the CCX. The sample consists 34 CCX firms and 75 comparison firms, 
coded as 1 and 0 respectively for the dependent variable. P-value are in 
parenthesis with ** and *** indicating significance at the 5% and 1% levels 
respectively. 
 
Roughly 23.7% of the firms decision to join the CCX can be explained by the independent variables used 
in the probit regression. Estimate for log of market value in year prior are found to be significant and 
indicate that larger firms are less likely to join. Herfindahl index for industry concentration provides 
significant positive results, indicating that firms in highly concentrated industries are more likely to join. 
These two results could be an indication that it is the smaller firm in the highly concentrated industries 
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that is making the decision to join to perhaps distinguish themselves from larger competitors. KLD 
ranking for number of community strengths provides significant and positive results, indicating that the 
presence of a community strength increases the probability of a firm joining the CCX.  
10. Conclusion 
Concerns over global warming and more specifically it’s relation to GHG emissions continue to 
be a pressing issue that urgently needs to be addressed. The U.S. continues to be the leading 
culprit in the area of overall amounts of GHG emissions and at the same time continue to show 
little initiative towards finding a solution to the problem. Failure to join global initiative projects 
such as the Kyoto Protocol combined with the lack of national reduction initiatives within the 
U.S. leaves environmentally conscientious companies with no other option then to join a 
voluntary initiative program such as the CCX. However, these voluntary initiatives can prove to 
be costly to the companies that join them. 
 This thesis explores the market reaction to a firm’s announcement of their decision to 
make a voluntary commitment to reduce GHG emissions, as well as the characteristics of firm 
who decide to make such a commitment. Overall results indicate that there is a negative market 
reaction to this announcement. These findings indicate that voluntary GHG initiative projects 
might conflict with investor’s interests, suggesting that investors would prefer that resources not 
be allocated towards corporate social responsibility, such as GHG emissions reductions, when 
then can be allocated towards more profitable projects. The lack of shareholder interest in 
voluntary emission reductions programs might imply that the only way in which the problem of 
GHG emissions can be properly addressed is through the introduction of federal legislations. The 
use of a cap and trade system in conjunction with government regulation has proven to be 
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successful in the past, such as in the case of  emission plans introduced by Clean Air Act 
Amendment in the 1990s. As the U.S. government continues to fail to react on the issue and is it 
appears the only truly viable solution to the problem is through the introduction of GHG 
emissions related legislation, perhaps there is greater need for public politics to take action and 
for the people of the United States to require their governments to hold firms accountable for 
their contributions to global warming.  
 The measures for political threats used in the study are recognized as being noisy. Sierra 
Club membership in the state in which each firm is headquartered, provides only a glimpse as to 
possible private political threats by activist citizens. Sierra Club is a grassroots organization 
covering many areas of social concern, making it difficult to link membership rates directly to 
political threats related to GHG emissions. Even more difficult to discern is the relationship of 
KLD statistics to political threats pertaining to GHG emissions, as the measure for KLD rating is 
somewhat ambiguous. Future research might explore the use of instrumental variables in order to 
define more distinct measures of political threats. Perhaps proxies for community involvement in 
social issues related to the environment might provide a clearer picture of what threats the firms 
are actually facing. Such proxies might include average age, areas of specialization or gasoline 
usage per capita for the communities in which the firms are part of. The challenge is in the 
operationalization of the public and private political threats, if future research were able to 
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Figure A1 shows historical CFI prices for the period 2003 to 2011. Figure 2 summarizes 
historical CFI by giving yearly averages for CFI prices. 
Figure A1. Historical CFI Prices from 2003 to 2011 
 
Table A1. Yearly Average CFI Prices 


























CFI Prices 2003- 2011 
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Window No. of days CARs > 0 Mean p-value Median p-value 
Day -60 to -6 55 11 0.0380 0.2620 0.0390   0.0842* 
Day -5 to 5 11 14 0.0174 0.1469 0.0130 0.2058 
Day -4 1 17 0.0058 0.2265 0.0001 0.5611 
Day -3 1 18 -0.0033 0.3078 -0.0020 0.5270 
Day -2 1 19 0.0022 0.4123 -0.0015 1.0000 
Day -1 1 20 -0.0003 0.9031 -0.0011 0.7068 
Day 0 1 12 0.0035 0.2058 0.0039 0.1714 
Day 1 1 15 -0.0002 0.9434 0.0033 0.6443 
Day -5 to 1 7 13 0.0090 0.2907 0.0062 0.2381 
Day -1 to 1 3 12 0.0031 0.6274 0.0044 0.3649 
Day 2 to 10 9 23 -0.0042 0.5809 -0.0137 0.2814 
Day 11 to 60 50 20 -0.0444 0.1829 -0.0230 0.1880 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) are calculated for firm  as  =  – 1, where  is the day 
relative to the announcement day ( ),  is firm ’s return and  is the market return. Value weighted 
portfolio including all distribution index provided by CRSP is used as market return.  * indicates significance at 
the 10% level, using t-test for means and Wilcoxin  signed-ranks for medians. 
 
 
Table A3. CARs Using Equally Weighted Portfolio Including All Distributions as Market Index 
Window No. of days CARs > 0 Mean p-value Median p-value 
Day -60 to -6 55 16 0.0000 0.9981 0.0186 0.9047 
Day -5 to 5 11 19 0.0008 0.9452 -0.0061 0.6942 
Day -4 1 20 0.0036 0.4116 -0.0009 0.9047 
Day -3 1 18 -0.0048 0.1732 -0.0034 0.2592 
Day -2 1 20 0.0006 0.8211 -0.0025 0.7583 
Day -1 1 22 -0.0033 0.2823 -0.0049 0.2314 
Day 0 1 14 0.0028 0.3411 0.0046 0.3471 
Day 1 1 17 -0.0016 0.6345 0.0006 0.9727 
Day -5 to 1 7 17 -0.0006 0.9393 -0.0005 0.9727 
Day -1 to 1 3 15 -0.0019 0.7806 0.0044 1.0000 
Day 2 to 10 9 23 -0.0109 0.1981 -0.0169 0.1462 
Day 11 to 60 50 20 -0.0437 0.2018 -0.0314 0.2120 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) are calculated for firm  as  =  – 1, where  is the day 
relative to the announcement day ( ),  is firm ’s return and  is the market return. Equally weighted 
portfolio including all distribution index provided by CRSP is used as market return.  T-test for means and 
Wilcoxin  signed-ranks for medians. 
 
 
Table A4. Cross-sectional Regressions on CARs Around Day -1 to 1 
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  Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 
Intercept -0.0695359 -0.0795053 -0.0470729 
 
(0.130) (0.055) (0.134) 
    Log Market Value Year Prior ($ million) 0.0107308 0.0102774 0.0092236 
 
(0.032**) (0.028**) (0.039**) 
    Price to book Year -1  -0.0120602 -0.0117012 -0.0112146 
 
(0.060*) (0.056*) (0.049**) 
    HHI 0.0185449 0.0231702 0.0120347 
 
(0.549) (0.425) (0.633) 




















    KLD No. of Env.  (Strengths – Concerns) 0.0050992 0.0037093 0.0051957 
 
(0.347) (0.449) (0.282) 
    KLD No. of Com. (Strengths – Concerns) -0.0096466 -0.0104338 -0.0112567 
 
(0.255) (0.201) (0.169) 
    Adjusted R-Squared -0.0060 0.0538 0.0413 
 
N=34 N=34 N=34 
Coefficient estimates from OLS estimations on  for 34 CCX firms. HHI is the Herfindahl industry 
concentration index, standard deviation is the standard deviation in prices for days -60 to -6, CFI price is the average 
price of CFIs in the 3-month period leading up to the announcement, Factiva Chicago Climate Exchange is number of 
search results using Factiva for “Chicago Climate Exchange” in the 3-Month period leading up to the announcement 
date, KLD No. of Env.  (Strengths – Concerns) and KLD No. of Com. (Strengths – Concerns) are composed of the 
difference between the strengths and concerns in each respective category. P-values are in parenthesis with * and ** 
indicating significance at the 10% and 5% level respectively. 
 
 
TableA 5. Cross-sectional Regressions on Abnormal Volume Around Day -1 to 1 
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  Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 
Intercept -0.9945885 -1.037883 -0.9232531 
 
(0.039) (0.021) (0.010) 
    Log Market Value Year Prior ($ million) 0.113153 0.1331758 0.1191567 
 
(0.028**) (0.009**) (0.016**) 
    Price to book Year -1  -0.0765148 -0.0908339 -0.0505823 
 
(0.233) (0.158) (0.403) 
    HHI 0.382249 0.2599412 0.0773263 
 
(0.234) (0.402) (0.779) 




















    KLD No. of Env.  (Strengths – Concerns) 0.0650237 0.076711 0.0773585 
 
(0.245) (0.149) (0.148) 
    KLD No. of Com. (Strengths – Concerns) -0.0710912 -0.067599 -0.0614109 
 
(0.410) (0.433) (0.487) 
    Adjusted R-Squared 0.1862 0.1701 0.1163 
 
N=34 N=34 N=34 
Coefficient estimates from OLS estimations on  for 34 CCX firms. HHI is the Herfindahl industry concentration 
index, standard deviation is the standard deviation in prices for days -60 to -6, CFI price is the average price of CFIs in 
the 3-month period leading up to the announcement, Factiva Chicago Climate Exchange is number of search results 
using Factiva for “Chicago Climate Exchange” in the 3-Month period leading up to the announcement date, KLD No. of 
Env.  (Strengths – Concerns) and  KLD No. of Com. (Strengths – Concerns) are composed of the difference between the 
strengths and concerns in each respective category. P-values are in parenthesis with ** indicating significance at the 5% 
level. 
 
